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ABSTRACT
The Dove’s Advantage: Impact of Gender and Conflict on Executive Approval

by

Micala H. Gillespie, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2020

Major Professor: Dr. Anna Pechenkina
Department: Political Science

Do citizens evaluate female vs. male leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently? The
number of countries that have had female leaders continues to expand, but little is known about
how domestic audiences reward or punish female (relative to male) leaders for foreign policy
choices. This study examines how the gender of a national leader conditions the relationship
between their hawkish/dovish ideology and public approval for rapprochement policies.
Experimental evidence establishes that voters approve more of hawkish leaders that extend the
olive branch to adversary nations than of dovish leaders who do so. Drawing on the extant
literature, I develop and test expectations about the effect of gender on public approval against a
sample of 128 leaders from 31 countries in 1975–2018. I find that female national leaders
(especially those of right-leaning ideology) tend to be penalized relative to men: all else equal,
women receive lower domestic approval than men. Interestingly, the public opinion data reveal
that neither male nor female leaders experience the hawk’s advantage for deviating from prior
aggressive policy positions. Instead, all leaders across all ideologies receive more support as they
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exhibit more compromising foreign policy behaviors. However, conflict outcomes, unlike
ideology, do not statistically significantly moderate public support of executives.

(61 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

The Dove’s Advantage: Impact of Gender and Conflict
on Executive Approval
Micala H. Gillespie

Do citizens evaluate female vs. male leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently? The number
of countries that have had female leaders continues to expand, but little is known about how
domestic audiences reward or punish female (relative to male) leaders for foreign policy choices.
This study examines how the gender of a national leader conditions the relationship between
their hawkish/dovish ideology and public approval for rapprochement policies in militarized
interstate conflicts. Results from time-series cross-sectional data using multiple regression
models with fixed effects from 31 countries and 127 leaders show that public approval tends to
be lower for women leaders and that right-of-center women are particularly prone to public
disapproval if they concede in international crises.
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INTRODUCTION
Do citizens evaluate female vs. male leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently? As
women often face a ‘double bind’ wherein “they experience disapproval for more masculine
behaviors, such as asserting clear-cut authority over others, as well as for their more feminine
behaviors, such as being especially supportive of others” (Eagly, 2007), women in national
leadership positions may be limited in their ability to navigate foreign policy well if they cannot
anticipate how domestic audiences will receive their actions. On the one hand, if women are
more likely to be supported in pursuing peace than men, then there may be more room for
reconciliation between adversarial nations when a woman is elected to the executive office. This
may represent a reason to elect females more frequently and may light the way for more female
leadership in other arenas. On the other hand, if women are only supported by voters when
initiating or escalating a conflict, or when acting outside of ‘soft’ or feminine gender stereotypes,
then women leader may select more hostile foreign policy outcomes, to the detriment of
international peace. As a state’s decision to work towards compromise with another country or
go to war with them is one of the most consequential, the uncertainty around the way gender and
public opinion interact to create incentives and penalties for leaders during conflict is of great
concern.
This thesis advances our understanding of how female national leaders are evaluated
relative to their male counterparts by testing whether the gender of the national leader interacts
with their 1) their ideology to influence domestic public approval and 2) their conflict outcomes
to impact public approval. Using the theoretical insights from public opinion literature on “out of
character” policy, policy deviation by hawks and doves, and scholarship on public opinion of
female leadership, I argue that because men and women in leadership positions are evaluated
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differently by domestic audiences, there likely exists a public approval reward for male leaders
who deviate from their prior policy reputation while female leaders receive no change in
approval for deviating from prior policy reputations. Where men who deviate from their prior
positions when dealing with international adversaries are viewed as moderates who are willing to
set aside their own interests for that of the nation, women are not. I test this argument against a
new, cross-national dataset with a sample of 128 leaders from 31 countries between 1975 and
2018, with 110 men in 31 countries and 18 women across 14 different countries.
This work makes three major contributions to extant scholarship on gender, public
opinion, and domestic sources of foreign policy.
First, it brings gender to the forefront of public approval literature as a significant
conditioning factor. The number of women in the highest positions of national leadership
continues to expand, but the scholarship on their public approval is severely lacking and thus
women coming into these positions may be at a disadvantage in not understanding how domestic
audiences will react to their actions.
Second, it tests the expectations for policy deviation for both men and women, using
public opinion data. Though prior research has attempted to shed light on shifts in public
approval for policies that deviate from the leader’s prior reputation by using experimental data,
little is known about whether these findings apply to women and whether these findings hold up
empirically. While there is good reason to use experimental research design, the penalties leaders
face would likely be more severe in an experimental setting because leaders strategically avoid
situations where their policy responses would knowingly be punished by voters. Using
observational public opinion data is advantageous in that it presents a conservative bias that may
be more accurate in assessing shifts in public approval due to a leader’s foreign policy.
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Third, it compares public approval for both escalation and de-escalation policies by
female-led and male-led states in conflict where prior research typically focuses on one or the
other. To this author’s knowledge, no research has explicitly tested public approval of both
hawks and doves in the pursuit of both peace and conflict. Existing research has primarily
focused on the question of whether Nixon was the only one able to maintain public support when
opening relations with China, essentially confining research to public approval of a hawk deescalating conflict.
The thesis is structured in four main sections. The first is a discussion of existing
literature on public opinion of “out of character” policy, policy deviations by hawks and doves,
public opinion on female leadership, and whether women in the workplace are evaluated
differently than women in the highest positions of national leadership. The second section
outlines my theory, building off existing findings that voters sometimes perceive policy
deviations by male leaders as a sign of moderation and credibility, and that gender biases cause
women to be evaluated differently than men. The third section is my research design and
describes my data, variables, and method in depth. The thesis concludes with my analysis of both
a full sample with two-way interactions and a split sample of men and women with de facto
three-way interactions, as well as a discussion of my robustness checks, limitations, and
implications for future work.

0

EXTANT LITERATURE
Public Opinion on “Out of Character” Policy
Research on consequences for leaders who act out of character or implement “unlikely”
policies, hereafter referred to as a policy deviation or norm deviation, is limited and often
conflicting. While some argue that leaders who ‘flip-flop’ or act outside of what is expected of
them are viewed as inconsistent and penalized, others show that leaders who deviate from their
established reputations may draw more favor from voters compared to leaders who do not
deviate. Whether these norms were based on party, ideology, or previous policy stances, it is
unclear whether support for policies outside one’s typical reputation leads to an increase or
decrease in public approval of the leader and their policy. This is a difficult question to study
from observational data because leaders should select only to change their positions if they
believe it will benefit their circumstance.
Tomz and Van Houweling (2009, 2012) use survey-based experimental data to show that
candidate repositioning is penalized because it prompts voters to discount the candidate’s current
policies and to draw negative inferences about the candidate’s character. Tomz (2007) posits that
this penalty might be not only stem from negative inferences about the candidate, but also from
citizens’ concerns about the country’s international reputation. Other survey experiments show
that the president loses support both when “backing down” from public threats and “backing
into” foreign conflicts (Levy et. Al., 2015) and roll call voting data shows that significant
electoral costs exist for senators who change their positions (DeBacker, 2014). Croco (2016)
argues the middle ground, that citizens do not always react negatively to a leader who changes
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his/her position, but are generally indifferent between a consistent and an inconsistent politician
provided that the politician supports the citizens’ own current preferred policy.
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) on the other hand, find that under democratic
conditions large shifts in economic policy are more likely to be implemented by the “unlikely”
party and that the more “unlikely” a policy is, the more incumbent parties gain an electoral
advantage. They theorize that this phenomenon is due to voters judging the credibility of the
policy based on the ideological identity of the policymaker. Cowen and Sutter (1998) also find
that right wing politicians are better suited to pursue left wing policies, because only a right-wing
politician can signal the credibility or soundness of a left-wing policy. While Petrocik (1996) and
Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen (2003) show that candidates increase their electoral prospects by
campaigning on and enhancing the salience of issues that their party has a reputation for
‘owning’ or caring about (i.e., Republicans would own issues of taxation and the size of
government, while Democrats would own social welfare issues), the country’s status and security
are issues that are not typically ‘owned’ by any one party (Petrocik et. al., 2003, p. 599) and thus
it remains unclear whether how voters might reward or penalize leaders for taking action in this
arena.
Policy Deviation by Hawks and Doves
When it comes to foreign policy, recent findings demonstrate that hawkish leaders who
deviate from the norm of military force and instead pursue diplomatic or conciliatory policies,
enjoy a significant boost in domestic approval ratings compared to dovish leaders who pursue the
exact same policy. It’s relevant to note that deviation from hawkish and dovish norms may or
may not constitute ‘flip-flopping’ on policy, i.e., a deviation constitutes a ‘flip-flop’ only if it
contradicts previous explicit promises on a given issue. Here, leaders may be viewed as deviating
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when they act outside their typical foreign policy preference for diplomatic vs. military means,
but may not be switching sides on specific policies. To be clear, hawks in this analysis are
characterized as leaders who typically favor military solutions over diplomatic ones and often
have reputations for emphasizing military force as an essential element in protecting national
security. They emphasize that they will not shy away from using force where necessary and are
likely to have a mindset that “the only way to achieve peace is to be ready for war” (Mattes and
Weeks, 2019, p. 58). Doves on the other hand, are described as leaders who prefer diplomatic
solutions over military ones. They typically emphasize that they believe diplomacy, cooperation,
and negotiations are key to national security and that they will use military force as a last resort.
The mindset of a dove would be that “the only way to achieve peace is to act peacefully” (Mattes
and Weeks, 2019, p. 58). Hawkish and dovish affiliations are thus distinct from ideological and
party affiliations, as they describe a leader’s overall foreign policy preferences.
Existing literature appears to primarily support a ‘hawk’s advantage’ in pursuing peace
and a disadvantage for doves who do the same. When hawks attempt to reconcile with a
distrusted adversary, voters react more favorably to them than dovish leaders who pursue the
exact same policy. However, the jury is still out on how voters perceive hawkish behavior. Based
on this theory of a domestic approval boost for leaders who act out of character, one might
expect doves to be rewarded when pursuing conflict and hawks to be penalized for pursuing
conflict, but there is no definitive evidence yet. Schultz’s (2005) models suggest that hawks are
more likely to initiate cooperation and more likely to see it last, but this analysis does not
examine how public approval changes as a function of such decisions. Mattes and Weeks (2019)
use survey experiments to demonstrate support for the thesis that hawks are better positioned to
pursue peace, finding that voters penalized both hawks and doves for opting for rapprochement
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over a status quo policy, but that the penalty was much more severe for doves. They also
demonstrate that even when the policy succeeded in eliciting a positive response from the
adversary, hawks were rewarded but doves were still penalized, theorizing that voters base their
public approval on assessments of the leader’s moderation and the policy’s credibility. This
suggests that voters do not condition their approval on the policy or policy outcome, but rather
on who is implementing the policy.
Counterarguments for why hawks should not experience an advantage in pursuing peace
also exist, with Clare (2014) showing that doves are rewarded in some ways for norm adherence
because their diplomatic reputations give them greater bargaining leverage with adversaries who
would rather deal with a diplomatic leader than a militaristic one. However, this study does not
focus on how public opinion changes as a result of these policy choices, as it only examines an
adversary’s likelihood of cooperating. Fehr (2014) also studies hawks pursuing peace and casts
doubt on the idea that the leader’s reputation matters at all, arguing that in the case of a hawkish
Nixon resuming relations with a then isolated communist China, public opinion was already
shifting on communism and that leaders can pursue ‘unlikely’ policies with minimal domestic
repercussions as long as “conditions are favorable and audience costs can be minimized.”
To sum up, experimental evidence suggests that policy deviation in foreign affairs tends
to be rewarded by voters. Yet, no empirical studies have put this question to the test directly,
while indirect evidence on the domestic advantage in pursuing out-of-character foreign policy
appears to have mixed support.
Public Opinion on Female Leadership
In the past half century, 56 of the 146 nations (38%) studied by the World Economic
Forum in 2014 and 2016 have elected a female head of government or state for at least one year,
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excluding figurehead roles (Pew, 2017). In 31 of these countries, women have led for five years
or less, in 10 nations they have led for only a year, and at least 13 have had women leaders who
held office for less than a year (Pew, 2017). These female-led states have included the United
Kingdom, Israel, Liberia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, France, Germany, Poland,
Canada, Brazil, Nicaragua, Argentina, Finland, Norway, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and New Zealand (Reiter, 2015). Although it is clear that female national leadership is not
confined to one geographic region or regime type, there exists a significant gap in the empirical
work both exploring the incentives women face for different conflict behaviors as well as the
way an executive’s gender, ideological affiliation, and dispute outcomes interact when pursuing
international peace or conflict. The following section outlines existing theories on the
relationship between gender and public expectations of leadership, with most of the literature
stressing that female leaders are evaluated differently than their male counterparts and may face
different incentives and penalties based on gender biased reactions to their leadership.
Gendered expectations are often based on both descriptive stereotypes about how
individuals actually behave as well as proscriptive stereotypes about how they should behave
(Eagly and Karau 2002). Though gender and sex are not the same, with the former being a social
construct that does not always coincide with biological sex, there are societal expectations that
men will be masculine, and women will be feminine. Burns and Kattelman (2017) among many
others state that this difference “makes the study of gender in International Relations particularly
murky, especially quantitatively.” As Everitt and Gaudet (2016) note, male leaders are
consistently stereotyped as being more strong, competent, tough, and assertive than women
(Alexander and Anderson, 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; McDermott, 1997). Women, on
the other hand, are stereotyped as conflict averse (Burns and Kattelman, 2017), compassionate,
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warm (Alexander and Anderson, 1993), emotional, people-oriented, gentle, kind, passive, caring,
and sensitive (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993). It remains unclear how much of this is due to
biological or sociological factors, but research does show that men and women typically favor
different perspectives on interpersonal conflict (Gilligan, 1982), negotiation strategies (Boyer et
al., 2009) support for democratic candidates in the US context (Chaturvedi, 2016), casualty
concerns, appropriate use of force (Eichenberg, 2003), prioritization of humanitarian vs.
economic and strategic concerns, and multilateralism (Brooks and Valentino, 2011). These facts
together demonstrate that there will likely be assumptions, expectations, and stereotypes that are
more likely to attribute a hawkish preference to men while attributing a dovish preference to
women.
These stereotypes result in a ‘double bind’ for female leaders in that they must
demonstrate masculine qualities to show that they are strong enough to lead and aggressive
enough to protect, as well as traditionally feminine traits of cooperation and compassion in order
to not violate gender roles (Burns and Kattelman, 2017). Further, gendered expectations and
stereotypes appear to work against women who seek positions of power even if they exhibit the
same behavior as men (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky, 1992). For example, the ‘backlash effect’
is thought to exist for female politicians who adopt masculine approaches, with perceptions of
role incongruity resulting in more negative and critical assessments due to negative perceptions
that accompany broken status norms (Butler and Geis, 1990; Eagly and Karau, 2002; Gidengil
and Everitt, 2003; Meeks, 2012; Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010; Ridgeway, 2001). Post and Sen
(2020) point out that while women may feel the need to adopt more agentic attributes in order to
rise to leadership roles, or those attributes that demonstrate assertiveness, independence,
ambition, dominance, forceful, confidence, or competitiveness, they still experience negative
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reactions from both men and women, and are viewed as emotional, less credible, and less
competent, while their male counterparts are viewed as more competent and credible (p. 4).
These findings have been documented elsewhere about female leaders who engage in discipline
(Atwater, Carey, and Waldman, 2001; 2005), initiation of salary negotiations (Bowles, Babcock,
and Lai, 2007), authoritative leadership style (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky, 1992),
competitiveness (Rudman and Glick, 1999), criticism (Sinclair and Kunda, 2000), and selfpromotion (Rudman, 1998). The backlash women in leadership positions receive for any agentic,
strong, or confident behavior is unfortunate, as women faced with scrutiny in masculinized
policy areas like national security often resort to more hawkish behavior or adopt more
aggressive foreign policies in order to gain credibility and avoid being seen as ‘soft’ (Burns and
Kattelman, 1992; Dube and Harish, 2017; Koch and Fulton, 2011).
Women in the Workplace vs. the Oval Office
The question remains then as to how women in the highest national leadership positions
have gained and maintained their seats despite facing penalties for both masculine and feminine
behavior. One possible explanation is that voters may expect masculine behavior in foreign
policy and more feminine behavior in domestic policy. Jalalzai (2008, 2010) argues that women
as ‘unifiers of the family’ may be elected after conflict under the expectation that they will unify
the country or in instances where their powers are constrained. This is not uncommon, as several
women have been elected to office directly following a conflict, perhaps because women’s
values and temperaments are believed to contrast favorably against those of the men who got the
nation into the conflict (Burns and Kattelman, 1992).
The more compelling explanation for the paradox of women rising to leadership positions
even when they face a ‘double bind’ however, may be that women who have been elected to the
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highest national leadership positions as presidents or prime ministers are evaluated differently
than women in the workplace and women in other levels of government. While the bulk of social
science and psychology research supports the idea of a ‘backlash’ effect for women exhibiting
agentic behavior in general, there is robust evidence in the international relations realm that
female national leaders are rewarded for masculine behavior, and indeed must be masculine in
order to rise to their positions and maintain them. For example, several researchers have found
that an increase in domestic gender equality levels and female legislators often leads to lower
levels of conflict and defense spending, but that having a female executive in office has the
opposite result with higher levels of defense spending and higher probability of escalating
disputes to violence (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Koch and Fulton, 2011). This is
not because female executives are more prone to violence and conflict initiation than men, but
rather that they are much more likely to have their bluffs called, their resolve questioned, their
disputes resisted and reciprocated, and be forced to take more escalatory measures to
demonstrate their resolve (Post and Sen, 2020, Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Burns and Kattelman
(1992) provide a further explanation for these findings, theorizing that the reason female
executives are more likely to uphold political empowerment rights while being less likely to
respect physical integrity rights is that women are generally more inclusive of marginalized and
minority groups, but have to “uphold their authority with an iron fist” and crush dissent when the
time calls for it. Women elected to the highest positions of state leadership may not be any
different in character or ideology than their male counterparts or women in other arenas, but
biases against them seem to provoke, reward, and necessitate more aggressive leadership and
conflict behavior.
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The experiences of leaders like Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, and Golda Meir appear
to support the ‘masculine’ selection effect for national leadership positions. Fukuyama (1998)
cites Thatcher’s role in the Falkland War and fight against the Irish Republican Army, Indira
Gandhi’s war with Pakistan and trials against Sikh separatists, and Golda Meir’s heavy-handed
policies against Palestine and the Arab world as evidence that women are more violent than men.
However, none of these female leaders initiated the crises in which they were involved (Caprioli
and Boyer, 2001). Additionally, more recent studies using expanded data show no relationship
between the gender of the national leader and propensity for interstate conflict (Horowitz, Stam,
and Ellis, 2015). Therefore, it seems more likely that women are simply forced to exhibit agentic
and ‘masculine’ behaviors when leading and protecting their countries to gain credibility with
the public, even if they are likely to be penalized for the same type of aggressive behavior
elsewhere.
There is thus far insufficient evidence to determine what kind of behavior voters expect
from their female national leaders, what situations result in men and women simply being
rewarded/penalized to different degrees for the same action, and when voters will penalize one
gender and reward the other. Positivist work in gender and international relations has addressed
conflict onset, interstate war, human rights, civil war, violence against civilians, international
norms, and globalization, but until now has not extensively regarded a leader’s gender as a
significant factor shaping domestic public approval of them and their foreign policy (Reiter,
2015). As such, my contribution in extending the hawk’s advantage thesis from male leaders
acting within previously established hawkish and dovish norms, to female leaders acting within
previously assumed gender norms and hawkish and dovish norms, may help us to better
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understand the hawk’s advantage and the incentives leading women in power to choose
cooperation or conflict.
The Argument: Moderation and Policy Credibility
Two Mechanisms Whereby Policy Deviation Is Rewarded: Moderation and Credibility
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) and Cowen and Sutter (1998) were some of the first to
model the policy credibility mechanism, or the reason why publics might believe a policy is in
the best interest of the nation (rather than in the best interest of the leader) when it comes from a
leader who would not typically propose that policy. Mattes and Weeks (2019) were the first to
test experimentally both the policy credibility mechanism as well a new mechanism that judges
the leader’s deviation from previously stated policy preferences, the moderation mechanism.
They demonstrate that voters approve more of hawks (than doves) pursuing rapprochement
foreign policy because voters’ believe that this strategy is more moderate than a hawk’s earlier
preference and thus is more in line with the best interest of the nation. While these two
mechanisms, the moderation and policy credibility mechanisms, are shown to account for why
publics reward hawks but not doves for peaceful foreign policy decisions in an experimental
setting (Mattes and Weeks, 2019), it remains to be seen whether this pattern holds up against
observational data. Furthermore, no study has tested whether the reverse is true about doves
enjoying an advantage when initiating more hostile foreign policy decisions. Finally, and most
importantly for this study, no evidence examines whether citizens evaluate female hawks and
doves differently than male ones.
The first mechanism is policy moderation. Voters are thought to perceive out-of-character
behavior or “unlikely” policies as a sign of the leader’s moderation or willingness to
compromise. Whereas leaders who act within their preferences are more often viewed as
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extremists, those who deviate are viewed as moderates. Therefore, leaders with hawkish
preferences are thought to be rewarded by voters when they pursue diplomatic approaches or
conciliatory policies because they are perceived to be ideologically moderate and compromising,
whereas leaders with dovish preferences would be penalized for pursuing the exact same action
because they appear to be ideological zealots or extreme pacifists.
The second mechanism is policy credibility. This mechanism contributes to the policy
deviation advantage and norm adherence disadvantage in that leaders who deviate from their
expected behaviors are thought to be pursuing policies in the best interest of the nation rather
than their own. This is distinct from the prior mechanism in that voters are making a judgement
about the policy, rather than the leader, based on the policy-policymaker pair. When leaders act
within their preferences and expected norms, voters may find it difficult to discern whether the
policy is in the best interest of the nation or whether the leader is blindly following their own
natural policy preference. When hawks pursue militaristic action for example, voters may
perceive the leader as acting within their own predispositions or inclinations. However, when
hawks deviate from the norm and pursue diplomatic or conciliatory policies, as Richard Nixon
did in 1972 delivering the olive branch to a distrusted communist Mao in China, then voters may
assume the deviation was for the good of the country and must be credible policy rather than a
personal preference.
Policy Deviations and Public Approval for Male Leaders
Table 1 presents the expected trends in public opinion for leaders deviating from and
adhering to their expressed political ideology; these trends may be labeled as ‘policy norm
deviation advantage’ and ‘policy norm adherence disadvantage.’ The shaded areas in Table 1
indicate the findings established in Mattes and Weeks (2019) via a survey experiment (whose
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survey prompts describe male leaders), while the unshaded areas present the logical implications
from these findings. Importantly, the unshaded implications in every table of this analysis have
not yet been tested experimentally; and none of these implications has been tested against
observational public opinion approval data cross-nationally.
Based on voters’ perceptions of moderation and policy credibility, Table 1 lays out the
expectations that leaders who deviate on policy are rewarded by voters, while those who do not
deviate on policy are punished. This is why in Table 1 hawks are expected to be rewarded for
dovish behavior in the bottom left quadrant (Mattes and Weeks show that this pattern exists),
while doves are expected to be rewarded for hawkish behavior in the top right quadrant.
Table 1 also presents the expected trend that leaders who do not deviate from the policy
norm expected by their ideology are penalized by voters. This theoretical expectation about a
policy norm adherence disadvantage (i.e., a penalty for acting in line with one’s reputation) is the
logical continuation of Mattes and Weeks’s theoretical model that voter reward those leaders
who deviate because voters assume that the leader is a moderate and the policy is in the nation’s
interest. By this logic, the expectation is that there will be a penalty for leaders who do not
deviate from previously expressed hawkish or dovish ideology, because voters would assume
that the leader is an extremist and the policy is in their own interest, rather than the nation’s. This
is why hawks are expected to be penalized for hawkish behavior (the top left quadrant of Table
1), because voters would think they are extreme warmongers and that they are instituting the
policy in their own interest, not the nation’s. Additionally, doves are expected to be penalized for
dovish behavior (the bottom right quadrant of Table 1), as voters will believe the leader is an
extreme pacifist and following their own interests instead of the nation’s.
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Table 1: Expected public opinion approval for male leaders for hawkish and dovish behavior
given their prior policy reputations
Hawk Affiliation

Dove Affiliation

Hawk
Behavior

No policy norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within hawkish norms
because the leader appears to be an
extreme warmonger and the policy
doesn’t seem credible

Policy norm deviation = Reward
for acting outside of dovish norms
because the leader appears to be a
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy
seems credible

Dove
Behavior

Policy norm deviation = Reward
for acting outside of hawkish norms
because the leader appears to be a
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy
seems credible

No policy norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within dovish norms because
the leader appears to be an extreme
pacifist and the policy doesn’t seem
credible

Note: The table compares the expected public approval for male leaders across two
dimensions: hawk/dove reputation (affiliation) and hawk/dove behavior. The shaded
areas have been supported experimentally by Mattes and Weeks (2019); the unshaded
areas are untested.
To reiterate, the shaded expectations in the bottom row of Table 1 were supported against
experimental data (Mattes and Weeks, 2019); none of these expectations have been tested against
observational data. The unshaded quadrants are this author’s extension of the Mattes and Weeks
(2019) theory that voters base their public approval on assessments of the leader’s moderation
and the policy’s credibility. The outlined expectations in the top row assume that when male
leaders follow their prior policy reputations, they will be penalized, and when they deviate from
their prior policy reputations, they will be rewarded. The contribution in this analysis is that we
test whether 1) experimental findings are also observed in the empirical world or whether leaders
select themselves out of penalties completely, and 2) whether the top row scenarios follow the
logic of the bottom row’s as can be inferred from Mattes and Weeks (2019).
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To sum up, relying on insights from Mattes and Weeks (2019), I expect that the same
logic of penalty and reward should apply to situations in which leaders pursue peaceful or
conflictual foreign policy. Therefore, we should expect:
H1: All else equal, the public approval of male leaders will tend to increase after male
leaders take foreign policy actions that deviate from their prior policy reputations.
H2: All else equal, the public approval of male leaders will tend to decline after male
leaders take foreign policy actions that adhere to their prior policy reputations.
Policy Deviations and Deviations from Gender Norms for Women
When citizens observe hawkish and dovish female leaders select peaceful or conflictual
foreign policy strategies, they not only judge female leaders’ strategies as policy deviations, but
also evaluate whether female leaders deviate from gender norms. I argue that in addition to
‘policy norm deviation advantage’ and ‘policy norm adherence disadvantage,’ female leaders are
also subject to public opinion punishments and rewards based on their deviation from or
adherence to gender norms. That is, when it comes to foreign policy, gender itself may have a
hawkish vs. dovish dimension in the eyes of citizens.
On the one hand, evidence from other disciplines suggests that women in the workplace
face a backlash when they display assertive, agentic, or aggressive leadership styles, because
they are deemed less credible and competent. At the same time, women are expected to practice
cooperation and compassion in the workplace as to adhere to gender roles. If such ‘double bind’
expectations exist for female national leaders, then one might expect that female leaders are
punished regardless of their previous policy affiliation or foreign policy actions.
On the other hand, if the evaluation of female leaders based on gender norms mirrors the
expected ‘policy norm deviation advantage’ and ‘policy norm adherence disadvantage,’ then one
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would expect that female leaders could benefit from gender norm deviation and could be
punished for adhering to gender norms. If so, a female leader would be viewed as a moderate
when pursuing more militant (i.e., more masculine or hawkish) foreign policies, and as an
extremist when acting as a dove. For instance, evidence from the United States shows that during
the times of terror threat, a Democratic woman will be evaluated more harshly than a Republican
woman (Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2016). This may be because female Democrats, that
tend to position themselves as doves on foreign policy issues, may be penalized for being
extreme pacifists. By contrast, Republican women, typically affiliated as hawks on foreign
policy, did not receive as harsh a penalty and may be seen as more moderate because of the way
their ‘dovish’ gender and ‘hawkish’ political preferences interact.
It remains unclear whether voters will base assessments of “out-of-character” behavior
more on the leader’s prior hawkish and dovish preferences, or on expectations about hawkish
and dovishness that are derived from gendered stereotypes. Since both aspects (gender and prior
hawkish/dovish preferences) are likely to be at least somewhat present in the subconscious of
voters when assessing a leader’s moderation and the credibility of their policy, there is likely an
interaction effect where gender and hawkish/dovish preferences, as well as gender and
hawkish/dovish conflict actions, interact to determine public approval.
While my expectations that male leaders are subject to a policy norm deviation advantage
(due to perceptions of moderation and credibility) and to a norm adherence disadvantage (due to
perceptions of extremism and self-interest) have a solid theoretical footing in the extant
literature, it is unclear whether the same expectations would apply to women. Two different
patterns emerge in the scholarship on how female leaders are evaluated and are outlined in the
following two subsections. The first scenario describes the expected changes in public approval
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for women national leaders who are treated the same as women in the general workplace, where
they are penalized no matter what behavior they exhibit, i.e., the ‘double bind.’ The second
scenario shows the expectations of public approval if women in the highest national leadership
positions are evaluated differently than women in the general workplace and are in fact rewarded
for their more agentic and masculine behaviors. That is, it is possible that ‘gender norm deviation
advantage’ and ‘gender norm adherence disadvantage’ exist for female national leaders.
Assuming Female National Leaders Are Treated Like Women in the Workplace
Table 2 shows the same public approval rewards for policy norm deviations and penalties
for adhering to policy norms as Table 1, but makes the leader a female so that gender stereotypes
are included as a salient factor shaping public opinion. In stressful situations where information
is lacking, individuals are prone to cognitive bias in which they deploy cognitive shortcuts in
order to process information (Post and Sen, 2020). As gender stereotypes (both implicit and
explicit) are one of the most powerful and prevalent cognitive shortcuts, even when compared
with race, occupation, and age, and are widely shared across cultures, it is likely that in times of
international conflict with incredibly high stakes and low information, gender stereotypes are
biasing and simplifying voter perceptions of their female leaders’ complex behavior (Catalyst,
2007; Eagly and Karau, 2007). The incongruity between ‘soft’ female gender roles and typical
‘hard’ leadership qualities likely produces a prejudice toward female leaders no matter what
action they take, leading voters to infer that women both possess less leadership capability and
are violating their gender roles just by holding their national executive position (Eagly and
Karau, 2007). The idea of role incongruity can best be exemplified by Pakistani President’s
statement about Indira Gandhi in 1971, that “Mrs. Gandhi is neither a woman nor a head of state
by wanting to be both at once” (Post and Sen, 2020, p. 19).
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As voters hold female candidates to much more stringent qualification standards than
male candidates (Bauer, 2019), they tend to have dissimilar beliefs about leaders and women
while holding similar beliefs about leaders and men (Eagly and Karau, 2007). Since citizens call
on gender stereotype shortcuts in times of crisis, it is likely that voters will have less favorable
attitudes towards female leaders than male ones and that women will have much greater
difficulty in being recognized as effective in their roles no matter what actions they take. In this
way, the backlash effect results in double bind for women in leadership and a penalty for female
leaders—regardless of their foreign policy actions—arising solely from their gender.
Where male hawks are expected to be rewarded for dovish behavior (a policy norm
deviation) and penalized for hawkish behavior (no policy norm deviation, see Table 1), the
expectations for female hawks should change, because voters would likely be also penalizing
women for holding leadership positions in which they are deviating from their gender roles.
Women of both ideological affiliations exhibiting hawkish behavior (the top row of Table 2) are
therefore expected to receive a penalty due to the backlash effect women face for agentic,
hawkish, militaristic, and aggressive behavior. Women who exhibit dove behavior by pursuing
more conciliatory and diplomatic approaches in conflict are also penalized. This is because they
appear too ‘soft’ in the realm of national security and their gender leads voters to believe they are
naturally incapable of defending the country.
Based on the ‘double bind’ worldview, women are penalized just for being women in
national leadership positions. Thus, the penalties and rewards they receive for policy norm
deviations are either amplified or balanced out by the penalty they receive because of their
gender. This means women affiliated as hawks and pursuing militaristic means over diplomatic
ones would receive two penalties: one for appearing extreme and acting within their own
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Table 2: Expected public opinion approval for female leaders for hawkish and dovish behavior
given their prior policy reputations, assuming the ‘double bind’ effect

Hawk
Behavior

Dove
Behavior

Hawk Affiliation

Dove Affiliation

No policy norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within hawkish norms
because the leader appears to be an
extreme warmonger and the policy
doesn’t seem credible

Policy norm deviation = Reward
for acting outside of dovish norms
because the leader appears to be a
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy seems
credible

Gender norm deviation = Penalty
for acting outside of gender-based
assumptions due to the backlash effect
women face for agentic behavior

Gender norm deviation = Penalty
for acting outside of gender-based
assumptions due to the backlash effect
women face for agentic behavior

Result = Double Penalty

Result = Status quo
(because receiving both a penalty and
reward should result in no change)

Policy norm deviation = Reward
for acting outside of hawkish norms
because the leader appears to be a
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy
seems credible. This would be the
typical hawk’s advantage.

No policy norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within dovish norms because
the leader appears to be an extreme
pacifist and the policy doesn’t seem
credible

No gender norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within gender-based
assumptions about women being
dovish and appearing too ‘soft’

No gender norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within gender-based
assumptions about women being dovish
and appearing too ‘soft’

Result = Status quo
(because receiving both a penalty and
reward should result in no change)

Result = Double Penalty

Note: The table compares the expected female domestic approval across two dimensions:
hawk/dove reputation (affiliation) and hawk/dove behavior. The outlined expectations
assume that female leaders face a “double bind”, i.e., a backlash for deviating from
gender norms (assertive women are viewed negatively) as well as a backlash for adhering
to gender norms (feminine women are also viewed negatively).
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interests when taking hawkish action and one for gendered backlash effects (top left quadrant of
Table 2).
Women politically affiliated as doves and taking hawkish action, on the other hand,
would receive one reward for acting outside of their political affiliation’s policy norm and one
penalty for gendered backlash effects (top right quadrant of Table 2). The reward for a policy
norm deviation balances the gender penalty and is expected to make no change in a female
leader’s public approval. It is unclear whether the reward for policy deviation will offset the
penalty drawn from gender bias and is especially interesting in determining whether these two
aspects are given the same weight by voters in the aggregate.
In the case of women pursuing peace, diplomacy, compromise, rapprochement, or
conciliatory action, we expect a reward for hawkish women and a penalty for dovish women.
Women affiliated as hawks are expected to be rewarded for the policy norm deviation because
their ideological affiliation positions them to be viewed as moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy
seems more credible (bottom right quadrant of Table 2). This would be the typical hawk’s
advantage. However, hawkish women still face backlash effects, so this is expected to balance
out the reward gained from the policy deviation and result in no change of public approval.
Women affiliated ideologically as doves pursuing dove action would be penalized twice
for acting within both of their expected policy and gender norms (bottom left quadrant of Table
2). This policy-policymaker pair is thus expected to receive the greatest drop in approval and
receive the most punishment from voters because the leader would be viewed as an extreme
pacifist and the strategy would draw the least amount of credibility because it is viewed as the
‘natural inclination’ of both females and doves.
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In summary, if we assume that national female leaders face a double bind, a backlash
effect, and are treated similar to women in the workplace, we should expect that like women in
an average workplace, female national leaders just “can’t win.” Adherence to female leaders’
prior reputations will tend to punished in both escalatory cases (because hawkish women deviate
from gender norms) and in de-escalatory scenarios (because dovish women adhere to feminine
gender norms). We therefore should expect:
H3: Compared to that of male leaders, the public approval of female leaders will tend to
stay the same (no approval bump) after female leaders take foreign policy actions that
deviate from their prior policy reputations.
H4: Compared to that of male leaders, the public approval of female leaders will tend to
decline to a greater extent after female leaders take foreign policy actions that adhere
to their prior policy reputations.
Assuming National Leaders are Treated Differently than Women in the Workplace
Social construction of what national leadership should look and behave like entails
extreme masculine behaviors, which is why national leadership has been one of last frontiers for
women to break through. Yet women have become chief executives of states across geographic
regions and regime types. While women undoubtedly face unique challenges in ensuring
domestic security that a male counterpart of the exact same qualification, political ideology, and
character would not, empirical trends suggest that female national leaders tend to use force
internationally to a greater degree than men. Recent examples of female national leaders
resorting to military force abound: Meir, Gandhi, Thatcher. One after another, a string of
international relations studies that systematically examine behavior of female versus male
leaders find that female executives escalate conflict, exhibit higher levels of violence, and are
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Table 3: Expected public opinion approval for female leaders for hawkish and dovish behavior
given their prior policy reputations, assuming that women’s deviation from traditional gender
norms is rewarded by citizens

Hawk
Behavior

Dove
Behavior

Hawk Affiliation

Dove Affiliation

No policy norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within hawkish norms
because the leader appears to be an
extreme warmonger and the policy
doesn’t seem credible

Policy norm deviation = Reward
for acting outside of dovish norms
because the leader appears to be a
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy seems
credible

Gender norm deviation = Reward
for acting within hawkish norms
because the leader appears to be to be
‘strong’ enough to lead and avoids
being viewed as too soft

Gender norm deviation = Reward
for acting within hawkish norms because
the leader appears to be to be ‘strong’
enough to lead and avoids being viewed
as too soft

Result = Status quo
(because receiving both a penalty and
reward should result in no change)

Result = Double Reward

Policy norm deviation = Reward
for acting outside of hawkish norms
because the leader appears to be a
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy
seems credible. This would be the
typical hawk’s advantage.

No policy norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within dovish norms because
the leader appears to be an extreme
pacifist and the policy doesn’t seem
credible

No gender norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within gender-based
assumptions about women being
dovish and appearing too ‘soft’

No gender norm deviation = Penalty
for acting within gender-based
assumptions about women being
dovish and appearing too ‘soft’

Result = Status quo
(because receiving both a penalty and
reward should result in no change)

Result = Double Penalty

Note: The table compares the expected female domestic approval across two dimensions:
hawk/dove reputation (affiliation) and hawk/dove behavior. The outlined expectations
assume that female national leaders are rewarded for more assertive behavior that
deviates from traditional gender norms.

21
more likely to be reciprocated against than their male counterparts (Post and Sen, 2020, Caprioli
and Boyer, 2001). Even the analysis of Europe in 1480–1913 reveals that female queens engaged
in wars more frequently than kings (Dube and Harish, 2020).
The fact that female leaders are so often selecting behaviors with higher levels of
violence and aggression suggests that these leaders are selecting these behaviors because they
expect that it will help them maintain office in the future. Whether the persistence of female
national leaders exhibiting masculine, aggressive, and violent behavior is due to conscious
strategic planning and considerations of domestic approval, or due simply to the fact that they are
challenged more often and simply have to react with an ‘iron fist’ in order to maintain their
positions, it appears that women who act with more aggression are advantaged.
Table 3 shows the expected domestic approval consequences for female national leaders
acting outside hawkish and dovish norms without a ‘backlash effect’ for agentic behavior.
Rather, in this scenario they are assumed to be treated differently than women in other leadership
positions, because their post as the chief executive is one of the most consequential for national
security and thus requires and rewards an agentic approach. Thus, we expect to see a reward for
women who pursue hawkish and militaristic behavior and propose that there may be a penalty
when they pursue conciliatory, peaceful, or placatory actions. Table 3 shows this reward for
gender norm deviations for women of both political affiliations who choose hawk behavior.
However, because female hawks acting as hawks are not deviating from their political norm,
they receive a penalty that cancels out the reward they received for gender norm deviation,
resulting in the status quo. Female doves acting as hawks on the other hand, receive two rewards:
one for the policy norm deviation and one for the gender norm deviation. This is because voters
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who see their leaders acting out of character are more likely to view them as moderates and more
likely to assume the policy must be in the best interest of the nation.
The bottom row of Table 3 details expectations for public opinion after female leaders
choose dove behavior. A penalty for women who pursue peace is anticipated, because gender
biases lead voters to believe that these women are only working towards compromise and
diplomacy because they cannot control their natural ‘pacifist’ inclinations. Thus, they are more
likely to be perceived as extreme rather than moderate, ineffective in their leadership role,
incapable of protecting the country, and following their own blind preferences rather than doing
what is right for the country. While hawks pursuing peace receive a reward for the policy norm
deviation that may cancel out this gendered penalty for dove behavior, female doves would
receive twice the penalty for acting within their expected preferences. If the women that rise to
chief executive positions are truly treated differently than both their male counterparts and
women in more general leadership roles, then doves pursuing conflict would receive the highest
gains in domestic approval while doves pursuing peace would see the greatest declines in
domestic approval.
In summary, if we assume that national female leaders are treated differently than women
in an average workplace such that citizens reward female leaders for more assertive behaviors,
i.e., for deviating from traditional gender roles, we should expect:

H5: Compared to male leaders, the public approval of female leaders with a hawkish
reputation is not expected to fluctuate in response to escalatory/de-escalatory foreign
policy actions.
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H6: Compared to male dovish leaders, the public approval of female leaders with a
dovish reputation will tend to increase to a greater extent after female doves take
escalatory foreign policy actions.

H7: Compared to male dovish leaders, the public approval of female leaders with a
dovish reputation will tend to decline to a greater extent after female doves take deescalatory foreign policy actions.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

Note on the Selection Effect
Leaders are strategic. This means that a national executive anticipates and avoids those
foreign policy strategies that are likely to be penalized by the public. If indeed, leaders select
themselves only into the situations that they think will benefit their chances of maintaining their
position in office (or party/faction reelection/holding on to power – depending on the political
regime), then any public disapproval of national leaders after international crises could
potentially be interpreted as a finding that is likely to be amplified in an experimental setting.
Data
To assess how a leader’s gender ideology, and conflict behavior impact his or her
domestic net approval, this study utilizes a new, cross-national dataset to test the above
hypotheses, combining data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Maoz et. al.,
2017), the Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) dataset (Bell, 2016), the
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Scartascini et. al, 2018), and the Executive Approval
Database (EAD) 2.0 (Carlin et. al., 2019).
The resultant time-series cross-sectional dataset uses the leader-year unit of analysis. The
years of observation include 1975–2018 across 31 countries and 128 state leaders. Given the
limited temporal scope and limited number of leaders, it is necessary to exercise caution in
generalizing these findings.
Dependent Variable
My argument holds that publics will reward and penalize leaders differently based on
their gender, ideology, and conflict behavior, so my dependent variable is executive public
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approval ratings from the Executive Approval Database 2.0. The Executive Approval Database
(EAD) 2.0 “represents the most comprehensive, publicly available collection of time-series
indicators of public support for political executives in the world” (Carlin et. al., 2019, p. 1).
Its advantage is that it measures presidential, prime ministerial, and government approval
for states in which the national leader is either directly elected or indirectly elected by the
legislature (Carlin et. al., 2019, p. 1). This continuous variable provides us with the most direct
measure of changes in public opinion and gives us the most accurate sense of how domestic
audiences are rewarding or penalizing their leader. The net executive approval by year shows us
the percentage of positive responses minus the percentage of negative responses across 31
countries in 1975–2018.
Independent Variables
Because our interest lies in determining whether citizens evaluate female and male
national leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently, one independent variable is the national
leader’s sex. This dichotomous variable Female coding females as 1 and males as 0 primarily
came from The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN). As this dataset
had a temporal constraint up to 2016, I extended the coding of the sex of leaders in office in
2016–2018. My sample includes 110 men and 18 women. Though there were more than 56
female national leaders in the past century, only 18 female leaders are included in my analysis
for several reasons. Some women were elected in mixed systems in which they were not the
primary decision-makers in conflict. Another thirty women were excluded because they were the
acting presidents and did not maintain their office for more than a few days or weeks.
Additionally, missingness of public approval and conflict data also contributed to excluding
female leader observations.
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My second independent variable Ideology comes from the Database of Political
Institutions. It is a trichotomous variable categorizing the chief executive as right-leaning, center,
or left-leaning. This variable does not completely capture hawkish, moderate, and dovish foreign
policy preferences but acts as a proxy. In this analysis, right-leaning is used to represent a
hawkish leader while left-leaning is used as a proxy for dovish ones. In order to interpret how the
interaction of gender and ideology affect executive approval, this variable was coded with rightleaning as 1, center as 2, and left-leaning as 3. In addition, some male leaders (and none of the
females) had no coded ideology, which has a value of 0.
The third independent variable is Conflict Outcome; it records how a militarized
interstate dispute ended. The data come from the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset from the
Correlates of War project. Because “authority in the military emphasizes hierarchy so that
individuals and units act according to the intentions of commanders,” the national executive is
likely to have a significant amount of decision-making power in conflict even if there is civilian
control of the armed forces or the executive is not the explicit commander in chief (Kohn, 1997,
p. 141). These dispute outcomes therefore attempt to capture a leader’s hawkish and dovish
preferences.
The dispute outcomes show whether a leader yielded, compromised, or came to a
stalemate in a conflict, with yield coded as 1, compromise as 2, and stalemate as 3. I categorize
a yield and compromise as dovish because these two outcomes imply that the leader was willing
to either cooperate, negotiate, pursue other diplomatic avenues, or back down from a militarized
aggression. I categorize a stalemate as hawkish because this implies that the leader was unwilling
to back down militarily and may have been less inclined towards negotiation or compromise.
The dispute outcome was coded as 0 when none of these outcomes occurred in a year and when
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leaders experienced no conflicts in a year, attributing a more dovish behavior to that leader if
they were able to diplomatically avoid all types of militarized interstate conflict. Losses and
victories were not included because the loss or victory of a nation in conflict does not reflect the
decisionmaker’s actions. Rather, these outcomes may have been due to forces like military size
and strength, alliances, and other factors beyond the leader’s hawkish or dovish preference.
Thus, a militarized interstate dispute outcome of a yield, compromise, or stalemate provides the
best measure of a leader’s foreign policy preferences in dealing with adversaries.
Controls
This research controls for country-specific variation by employing fixed effects. In
addition, I control for Duration in Office, a cumulative sum of years during which the leader has
held office.
In the future versions of this research, it will be important to control for economic
indicators and international rivalries.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in my analysis. My sample
includes the leaders of 31 countries, with 110 men and 18 women. The male leaders in my
sample held their executive positions between 1975-2018 in all 31 countries while the women in
my sample included those who held office between 1979-2018 across 14 different countries. As
for leaders classified as hawks because of their right leaning ideology, 49 were men and 8 were
female. On the left, 45 men and 8 women were classified as doves. The rest were in the center,
making the two ideological groups of interest roughly equally represented in the sample.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Net Approval
Ideology
Female
Conflict outcome
Country ID
Year
Duration in office
Observations

N
539
539
539
539
539
538
539
539

Mean
4.444308
1.697588
0.1762523
0.7625232
217.9759
2000.92
7.12987

SD
22.56478
1.151778
0.3813887
1.275741
226.01
9.14273
3.916154

Min
-79.7141
0
0
0
2
1975
0

Max
63.09252
3
1
3
920
2018
19

Sum
2395.482
915
95
411
117489
1076495
3843

Method
The dependent variable, domestic public net approval of the national leader, is
continuous, thus I use ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors to estimate
the effects of independent variables on public opinion. I test whether the gender of the national
leader interacts with their ideology to influence domestic public approval (Model 1, Table 5). I
also test whether gender interacts with conflict outcomes to impact public approval (Model 2,
Table 5).
Additionally, using the same method and model specification, Models 3 and 4 of Table 8
present the split sample analysis for male and female leaders separately. These models serve as
de factor three-way interaction effects between gender, ideology, and conflict outcomes.
All models employ robust standard errors and fixed effects for countries to account for
interstate disparities.
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ANALYSIS

The expectations describe an interaction between three theoretical determinants of public
opinion: gender, ideology, and conflict outcome. In the following two sections, I first analyze the
impact of interactions between gender and ideology and gender and conflict outcome using the
full sample. I then present the analysis of the interaction between ideology and conflict outcome
for the split samples of male and female leaders separately.
Analysis Using Full Sample with Two-Way Interactions
The results presented in Table 5 inform us whether female leaders are evaluated
differently than men as a function of their ideologies (holding conflict outcomes constant) and as
a function of conflict outcomes (holding ideology constant). It is important to note, however, that
these results do not test the hypotheses directly.
Model 1 of Table 5 shows how gender conditional on ideology shapes public opinion of
leaders. All coefficient estimates in Model 1 with the exception of Conflict Outcome are
statistically discernible at the 95–99% confidence level, meaning that under the repeated datagenerating process this effect would be observed by chance alone less than 5–1% of the time.
The coefficient for Female in Model 1 shows the impact of gender when ideology is set to zero.
Recall that ideology set to 0 is not meaningful for female leaders (as there are none in the sample
who were coded that way). The estimate for Ideology in Model 1 captures the impact of one-unit
increase in ideology for male leaders: as their ideology changes from no ideology to rightleaning to center to left-leaning their net approval increases by 3 percentage points. It is
important to note that this finding does not undermine the hawk's advantage thesis, as the hawk’s
advantage is implied to exist only during the times of rapprochement, while this model includes
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observations during both conflictual and peaceful times. The coefficient for the interaction term
labeled Gender x Ideology shows that females who moved towards ideological left receive an
almost 10 percentage point increase in public approval. To better interpret this interaction term, I
rely on Table 6.

Table 5: The impact of gender and ideology on net approval
Independent
Variable
Female

Models
(1)
-30.26***
(8.27)

(2)
-7.72
(4.59)

Ideology

3.19***
(0.93)

4.15***
(0.91)

Gender x Ideology

9.82**
(3.15)

---------

Dispute Outcome

1.12
(0.78)

0.87
(0.82 )

Gender x Outcome

---------

0.52
(2.41)

Duration in office

1.28***
(0.34)

1.18**
(0.34)

Country fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Intercept

-17.12***
-17.63***
(4.05)
(4.14)
N observations
539
539
N countries
31
31
N leaders
128
128
N female leaders
18
18
R2
0.373
0.358
Note: Coefficient estimate (robust standard errors); ‘***’p< 0.001 ‘**’ ’p< 0.01 ‘*’ ’p<0.05.

Table 6 shows the predicted values of net approval for all combinations of the interacted
variables. The main takeaway from this analysis is that a leader’s gender indeed conditions the
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relationship between their ideology and public approval, and that ideology has a substantively
larger effect on women’s approval than on men’s. Hawkish females received substantially lower
approval than their male counterparts (net approval for women falls within the 95% confidence
interval of -27 to -5, while for men within that of -3 to 4.5), consistent with the ‘backlash effect’
where women are penalized for acting hawkishly, i.e., “outside” of their gender roles.
It is important to note that this effect does not test my main argument directly, as these
effects on approval are estimated independently of conflict outcomes. Furthermore, an average
centrist male leader has substantially higher net approval than a typical female centrist: 4.8 to
9.4 vs. -11.to 4.5. Only for leaders of left-leaning ideology there is no statistically discernible
difference between males’ and females’ net approval. That is, only left-leaning women leaders
avoid the gender penalty.

Table 6: The predicted values of net approval by leaders' gender and ideology
predicted
gender
ideology
value
se
z
p
lower 95
upper 95
men
no ideology
0.7401537
1.909183
0.39
0.698
-3.010802
4.491109
men
right
3.927975
1.280655
3.07
0.002
1.411884
6.444067
men
center
7.115797
1.17049
6.08
0
4.816145
9.415449
men
left
10.30362
1.683713
6.12
0
6.995642
13.6116
women
no ideology
-29.52395
7.737762
-3.82
0
-44.72627
-14.32164
women
right
-16.51315
5.362438
-3.08
0.002
-27.04869
-5.977615
women
center
-3.502353
4.049536
-0.86
0.388
-11.45844
4.453735
women
left
9.508446
4.775139
1.99
0.047
0.1267703
18.89012
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 1 of Table 5.
Model 2 of Table 5 shows how gender conditional on conflict outcome shapes public
opinion of leaders. The constituent term coefficients for Dispute Outcome and for Female in
Model 2 are not statistically discernible at conventional levels. Substantively, the coefficient
Female is negative, implying that during the times of no conflict, female leaders are penalized in
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net approval by almost 8 percentage point relative to men. This suggests that female leaders who
pursued neither aggressive nor conciliatory approaches internationally still face a penalty for
being female (regardless of ideology).

Table 7: The predicted values of net approval by leaders' gender and conflict outcome
predicted
gender
outcome
value
se
z
men
no conflict
5.1054
1.314123
3.89
men
yield
5.976778
1.131946
5.28
men
compromise
6.848157
1.484226
4.61
men
stalemate
7.719536
2.119385
3.64
women
no conflict
-2.617042
3.886985
-0.67
women
yield
-1.227634
4.407661
-0.28
women
compromise 0.1617749
5.826903
0.03
women
stalemate
1.551184
7.660589
0.2
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 2 of Table 5.

p
0
0
0
0
0.501
0.781
0.978
0.84

lower 95
upper 95
2.523554
7.687245
3.752854
8.200702
3.932112
9.764203
3.555598
11.88347
-10.25377
5.019685
-9.887328
7.432061
-11.28629
11.60984
-13.49951
16.60188

Here, I discuss statistically nonsignificant results; while this may seem irrelevant, the low
number of female observations makes it possible that differences do not appear statistically
important due to a lack of cases. Therefore, assuming nonsystematic missingness of female
observations, these substantive effects may suggest the effects from a fuller set of cases.
The interaction term Gender x Outcome is neither substantively nor statistically
important, as the predicted values of net approval for all combinations of values of gender and
conflict outcome demonstrate (Table 7). That is, neither for male nor for female leaders’ public
opinion changes noticeably if leaders pursue a yield instead of compromise or a compromise
instead of stalemate. Although each predicted value of approval for male leader is different from
0, they are not statistically different from each other. This means that the hawk’s advantage
revealed by experimental studies may not exist in observational data. I discuss this possibility in
the conclusion.
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These values are also not statistically different from the approval of female leaders given
the same conflict outcome. This is driven by the scarcity of observations for women in the
specified conflict outcomes: out of 18 female leaders in the sample, none compromised and only
1 female leader yielded and only 4 saw a stalemate, suggesting that female executives tend to
avoid more conciliatory foreign policy outcomes.
Analysis Using Split Sample: Men vs. Women
In this section, I analyze the interaction between ideology and conflict outcomes for male
and female leaders separately. This split sample approach effectively allows me to estimate the
impact of a three-way interaction.
Model 3 of Table 8 presents the interaction between Ideology and Conflict Outcome only
for men, while Model 4 — only for women. In both models, the coefficient estimate for Ideology
is positive and statistically significant. This means that one-unit change in Ideology generates a
net positive approval for men (Model 3) and women (Model 4), who experience none of the
conflict outcomes of interest: male leaders are estimated to see a 3 percentage point rise as their
ideology changes from right-leaning to center to left-leaning, while for women each one-unit
change in ideology generates a staggering 21 percentage point jump in approval when no conflict
outcomes occur.
While neither interaction term is statistically discernible, it is important to note that the
signs for the interaction in Model 3 is positive but in Model 4 is negative. To ease interpretations
of these effects, I have included all predicted values of net approval for male and female leaders
in Tables 9 and 10 respectively.
Table 9 conveys two main takeaways. First, left-leaning men enjoy higher net approval
than right-leaning men regardless of conflict outcomes. For instance, when no conflict outcomes
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occur, right-leaning and left-leaning male leaders are predicted to have a net 2 and 8 percentage
point approval estimates respectively (Model 3). Within each category of ideology, as a male
leader experiences no conflict outcome as opposed to yielding as opposed to compromise as
opposed to stalemate, his net approval rises, however, these changes in predicted net approval
are not statistically discernible from each other. That is, difference in predicted values of net
approval for male leaders of different ideologies are statistically significant, but differences in
predicted values of net approval for different conflict outcomes within the same ideological
categories are not statistically discernible from each other.

Table 8: The impact of gender and ideology on net approval for male vs. female leaders
Only men
Independent
Variable

Only women
Models

(3)

(4)

Ideology

3.26**
(1.14)

21.33***
(2.939)

Conflict Outcome

0.674
(1.31)

8.777
(5.269)

Ideology x Conflict Outcome 0.057
(0.606)

-2.318
(4.487)

Duration in office

1.429***
(0.365)

-0.674
(0.866)

Country fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Intercept

-17.406***
-86.42***
(4.259)
(10.48)
N observations
444
95
N countries
31
14
N leaders
110
18
2
R
0.358
0.561
Note: Coefficient estimate (robust standard errors); ‘***’p< 0.001 ‘**’ ’p< 0.01 ‘*’ ’p<0.05.
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Table 9: The predicted values of net approval by ideology and conflict outcome for male leaders
conflict
predicted
ideology
outcome
value
se
no ideology no conflict
-1.423679
2.288816
no ideology yield
-0.7494341
1.81794
no ideology compromise -0.0751896
2.189589
no ideology stalemate
0.5990549
3.115584
right
no conflict
1.835401
1.412689
right
yield
2.566524
1.098772
right
compromise
3.297647
1.450128
right
stalemate
4.028769
2.163887
center
no conflict
5.094481
1.161515
center
yield
5.882482 0.9340927
center
compromise
6.670483
1.345745
center
stalemate
7.458484
2.040741
left
no conflict
8.353561
1.816304
left
yield
9.19844
1.516771
left
compromise
10.04332
1.97959
left
stalemate
10.8882
2.855436
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 3 of Table 8.

z
p
lower 95
-0.62 0.534
-5.922733
-0.41
0.68
-4.322902
-0.03 0.973
-4.379197
0.19 0.848
-5.525152
1.3 0.195 -0.9414783
2.34
0.02
0.406702
2.27 0.023 0.4471747
1.86 0.063
-0.224716
4.39
0
2.811326
6.3
0
4.046365
4.96
0
4.025193
3.65
0
3.447063
4.6
0
4.783308
6.06
0
6.21697
5.07
0
6.152099
3.81
0
5.275357

upper 95
3.075376
2.824034
4.228818
6.723261
4.61228
4.726346
6.148119
8.282255
7.377636
7.718599
9.315773
11.46991
11.92381
12.17991
13.93454
16.50104

Table 10 presents the predicted net approval for female leaders as a function of their
ideology and conflict outcomes. I only show the net approval for the cases of no outcomes and
cases of stalemates, as no women in the sample experienced a compromise and only one female
leader yielded in a crisis, suggesting that female national leaders select themselves out of
situations when they lose or compromise in international disputes. Furthermore, there are only
four female leaders in the sample who collectively oversaw 13 stalemates, this makes the
confidence intervals extremely wide for the estimates of net approval, which is why none of the
estimates for the stalemate scenario are statistically discernible from each other.
Table 10 delivers two main takeaways. First, when female leaders experience no conflict
outcomes, left-leaning females enjoy substantially higher net approval than right-leaning women.
These estimates are statistically discernible from each other. Second, experiencing a stalemate
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increases the net approval estimate of female executives, however these effects are not
statistically important.

Table 10: The predicted values of net approval by ideology and conflict outcome for female
leaders
conflict
predicted
ideology
outcome
value
se
z
p
lower 95
upper 95
no ideology no conflict
-42.54544 7.574844
-5.62
0
-57.62888
-27.462
no ideology stalemate
-16.21371 15.81522
-1.03 0.308
-47.70584
15.27842
right
no conflict
-21.20746 4.308785
-4.92
0
-29.78734 -12.62757
right
stalemate
-1.831304 4.976286
-0.37 0.714
-11.74035
8.077747
center
no conflict
0.130529 2.041439
0.06 0.949
-3.934494
4.195553
center
stalemate
12.55111 13.08589
0.96
0.34
-13.50622
38.60844
left
no conflict
21.46851 3.766138
5.7
0
13.96917
28.96785
left
stalemate
26.93352 26.25933
1.03 0.308
-25.35549
79.22252
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 4 of Table 8.

Robustness Checks
I have checked whether the results are impacted by dropping any particular leader; they
are not.
I have also run the analysis with two versions of the Dispute Outcome variable, the first
in which victories and losses were included in the 0 category and the second excluding victories
and losses from the 0 category so that 0 represents a leader having no militarized conflicts in that
year. Since victories and losses were not common, this only resulted in the list-wise deletion of
seven observations and did not affect the results, as is demonstrated by Tables 11 and 12 which
replicated Tables 5 and 8 respectively.
I also ran models with two-way fixed effects, such that not only country-level variation
but also year-level variation was accounted for. All results are very similar.
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Table 11: Robustness checks for Table 5

Independent
Variable
Female

Models
(5)
-30.60***
(8.260)

(6)
-7.662*
(4.622)

Ideology

2.945***
(0.935)

3.942***
(0.926)

Gender x Ideology

10.01***
(3.154)

Dispute Outcome
(no victories or losses)

1.104
(0.789)

Gender x Outcome

0.536
(2.409)

Duration in office

1.277***
(0.343)

1.181***
(0.351)

Country fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Intercept

0.837
(0.828)

-16.55***
-17.10***
(4.06)
(4.15)
N observations
532
532
N countries
31
31
N leaders
128
128
N female leaders
18
18
R2
0.372
0.357
Note: The baseline category of Conflict Outcome represent no conflict only. Coefficient estimate
(robust standard errors); ‘***’p< 0.001 ‘**’ ’p< 0.01 ‘*’ ’p<0.05.
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Table 12: Robustness checks for Table 8
Only men
Independent
Variable

Only women
Models

(7)

(8)

Ideology

2.931 **
(1.150)

21.34 ***
(3.494)

Dispute Outcome
(no victories or losses)

0.519
(1.307)

8.777*
(5.269)

Ideology X Dispute Outcome 0.137
(0.608)

-2.319
(4.488)

Duration in office

1.430***
(0.370)

-0.675
(0.866)

Country fixed effects

Yes

Yes

N observations
437
95
2
R
0.356
0.561
N countries
31
14
N leaders
110
18
Note: The baseline category of Conflict Outcome represent no conflict only. Coefficient estimate
(robust standard errors); ‘***’p< 0.001 ‘**’ ’p< 0.01 ‘*’ ’p<0.05.

Limitations and Future Work
The current study is an early step towards unpacking the influence of gender, ideology,
and conflict outcomes on public approval of national leaders. The data utilized in this study have
many shortcomings. Mainly, in my future work, I will recode the ideology measure such that it
captures a leader’s foreign policy positions as opposed to positions within the ideological
landscape of domestic policy. For instance, a hypothetical president Hillary Clinton would have
been coded in these data as left-leaning, therefore my model would assume her as a dove on
foreign policy despite her enthusiasm for interventionism. Coding hawk vs. dove reputation
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would also alleviate data missingness problem which forces me to remove some observations of
female leaders in conflict.
Additionally, observational studies are prone to some omitted variable biases. Here, there
is the chance that significant shifts in executive approval data based on executive scandals or
drastic changes in social or economic stability were not accounted for.
In addition to recoding key variables and expanding the number of controls in the
models, future work should also investigate whether the data exhibit autocorrelation and account
for that methodologically.
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CONCLUSION

Despite significant progress towards gender equality, the data reveal women leaders are
evaluated differently than their male counterparts. My argument centers on a leader’s foreign
policy actions interacting with their ideology and gender to affect public approval ratings. The
data demonstrate that militarized conflict outcomes do not significantly shift public opinion,
though ideology and gender do. Therefore, I did not find evidence to support my hypotheses 1
through 4 and 6–7. My fifth hypothesis, that the public approval of female leaders with a
hawkish reputation would not be expected to fluctuate in response to foreign policy actions when
compared to male leaders, was inconclusive. It appears that foreign policy actions had little
impact, but hawkish females did receive substantially lower approval ratings than male hawks,
male doves, and female doves.
Another expectation—that the public approval of female leaders would tend to stay the
same (no approval bump) after taking foreign policy actions that deviated from their prior policy
reputations while men would receive a boost in public approval—could not be tested, as none of
the female leaders in this sample ever compromised and there was only one instance of yielding.
This strongly suggests that women try to avoid conciliatory outcomes, in line with the gender
norm deviation reward worldview.
Furthermore, the data reveal that—in contrast to the experimental findings—men on the
other hand, do not appear to experience an advantage for deviating from prior reputations. My
hypothesis that all else equal, the public approval of male leaders would tend to increase after
taking foreign policy actions that deviated from their prior policy reputations and decline after
taking foreign policy actions that adhered to their prior reputations, was not consistent with the
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data. While male hawks were estimated to receive higher net approval when they exhibited
conciliatory outcomes, male doves enjoyed even more net approval when they did so.
While future studies should attempt to test the hawk’s advantage hypothesis against a
fuller set of cases, this thesis provides grounds for doubting whether the hawk’s advantage can
be observed empirically for either men or women, as leaders strategically avoid disadvantageous
conflict outcomes. There may be potential for more peace if both male hawks and male doves are
rewarded for conciliatory foreign policy. Women on the other hand, may not receive the same
public approval rewards.
Where women appear to select themselves out of conciliatory, left-leaning, or dovish
behaviors in times of militarized interstate conflict, this analysis has uncovered that women in
this sample were significantly rewarded for a left-leaning or dovish ideology. While the hawk’s
advantage thesis suggests that men with hawkish ideologies are advantaged over doves when
pursuing rapprochement policies in experimental data, I find that women received higher public
approval when leaning ideologically left, with left in this data presuming dove behavior on
foreign policy. I also find that when holding conflict outcomes constant, female hawks received
the worst net approval compared to male hawks and to women who leaned more towards dove
ideology.
The gendered double bind that women face suggests that women have to be feminine in
office to maintain their support, but that the very display of femininity during times of conflict
may be used against them to show that they are incompetent leaders and that their strategies are
not in the interest of the nation. Therefore, women face significant barriers both in reaching highstatus political positions and in choosing foreign policy strategies. The perpetuation of gender
biases and their impact on shaping a state’s foreign policy decisions in conflict has far-reaching
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and costly implications. If women are only supported by voters when initiating or
escalating a conflict, then this may incentivize more hostile international relations when women
are elected during times of conflict. The results of this analysis offer some hope in that if leftleaning or dovish women are likely to be supported for their ideology, even if they are not
supported for acting on those preferences in times of militarized conflict, then there may be more
room for reconciliation between adversarial nations led by women leaders.
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